An Expected Utility maximizer can be risk neutral over a set of nondegenerate multivariate distributions even though her NM (von Neumann Morgenstern) index is not linear. We provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an individual with a concave NM utility to exhibit risk neutral behavior and characterize the regions of the choice space over which risk neutrality is exhibited. The least concave decomposition of the NM index introduced by Debreu [3] plays an important role in our analysis as do the notions of minimum concavity points and minimum concavity directions. For the special case where one choice variable is certain, the analysis of risk neutrality requires modi…cation of the Debreu decomposition. The existence of risk neutrality regions is shown to have important implications for the classic consumptionsavings and representative agent equilibrium asset pricing models.
Introduction
Standard textbook treatments of the economics of risk typically show that an Expected Utility maximizer will be risk neutral in the univariate case if and only if her NM (von Neumann and Morgenstern [23] ) index is linear (e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [16] , p. 186). However for bivariate lotteries or distributions, the assumption that the NM utility takes the following linear form U (c 1 ; c 2 ) = c 1 + c 2 + ;
where c 1 and c 2 denote units of two di¤erent commodities, is only su¢ cient and not necessary for risk neutrality. 1 An individual with a concave NM index not taking the form (1) can be risk neutral toward subsets of multivariate lotteries. We refer to these subsets as risk neutrality regions of the full choice space of lotteries or distributions. 2 In this paper, individuals are assumed to possess Expected Utility preferences. We derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for when a consumer with an NM index not taking the linear form (1) is risk neutral toward a subset of lotteries and characterize the regions of the choice space in which risk neutrality is exhibited. Since the results for the bivariate case naturally generalize to multivariate distributions, we focus on just the simpler bivariate case. 3 We also consider the important special case where one attribute is certain and the second is random. The existence of risk neutrality regions can have important implications for popular application problems where the NM index is concave and does not take the form (1) . First, suppose a consumer faces the classic two period consumption-savings, capital risk problem with a single risky asset. In response to a pure increase in the risk of the asset's return (i.e., a mean preserving spread), optimal savings can remain unchanged which is consistent with risk neutral behavior. Second assume a two period representative agent exchange economy in which there exists one risky and one risk free asset. Then for a particular endowment of period one consumption, the equilibrium risk premium can go to zero which is consistent with the representative agent being risk neutral. 1 Whereas the discussion of risk neutrality is commonplace for the case of univariate distributions, the multivariate case is much less thoroughly investigated. One interesting exception is Safra and Segal [21] , who consider multivariate risk neutrality for non-Expected Utility preferences. 2 In a number of papers that have sought to extend the notion of risk aversion to multivariate Expected Utility preferences, the authors have tended to de…ne risk attitudes in terms of utility indices. Reference to risk neutrality arises as the extreme of an individual being both risk averse and risk prone. See, for instance, Duncan [4] , Karni [11] , Kihlstrom and Mirman [12] and Hellwig [8] . 3 In the online Appendix L, we consider a speci…c example which illustrates how several of the key concepts investigated in this paper extend to more than two choice variables.
A key element in our analysis is Debreu's [3] classic decomposition of a concave, multicommodity NM index into a least concave utility representing certainty preferences over commodity vectors and a univariate concave transformation re ‡ecting risk preferences. Debreu's focus was on proving the existence of a least concave utility given that a concave NM utility is known to exist. However in order to distinguish the speci…c set of lotteries toward which the consumer is risk neutral, one must go beyond existence and actually derive from a given concave U the speci…c form of the least concave utility. One must also identify the set of minimum concavity points and minimum concavity directions (characterizing where and in which directions the Hessian of the least concave utility vanishes). The very popular homothetic and quasihomothetic NM utilities 4 permit particularly clear characterizations of the subset of risk neutral lotteries. This follows from the very special properties of the minimum concavity points and minimum concavity directions of these utilities (see Kannai and Selden [10] ). However we emphasize that risk neutrality regions also occur for non-homothetic and non-quasihomothetic preferences.
To extend our analysis of risk neutrality to the case where one of the commodities is certain, it is necessary to modify Debreu's decomposition result. For a given NM index, the set of minimum concavity points, minimum concavity directions and least concave utilities can di¤er when one commodity is certain versus when no commodity is certain. As a result, the risk neutrality regions will typically change. As we discuss in Section 5, the fact that the least concave utilities can diverge when one of the commodities become certain seems to have been missed in the literature. Not recognizing this point can result in decompositions of a given NM index into certainty preferences and risk preferences which are erroneous and ultimately lead to incorrect behavioral predictions such as how an individual will react to increasing risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give two motivating examples. The …rst illustrates the existence of risk neutrality regions in a standard lottery choice setting. The second demonstrates that risk neutrality regions can have interesting implications for optimal savings behavior. Section 3 reviews the de…nitions of risk neutrality toward univariate and bivariate probability distributions. In Section 4, we …rst discuss the notions of least concave utility, minimum concavity points and minimum concavity directions and then use them to characterize the subsets of distributions where an individual will be risk neutral. Section 5 considers the special case where one preference attribute is certain. Section 6 provides two additional economic applications. Selected proofs are provided in the Appendix of this paper and the remaining proofs and supplemental materials are available in an online Appendix. the individual is not risk neutral but rather is risk averse toward L 3 since her Expected Utility is lower for L 3 than for L 4 .
The next example is based on the classic two period consumption-savings, capital risk problem. Certain …rst period and random second period consumption are denoted, respectively, by c 1 and e c 2 . In period one, the consumer is endowed with income I and chooses how much to consume c 1 and save I c 1 . Saving takes place via a risky asset paying a risky (gross) rate of return e R. Random period two consumption is given by e c 2 = e R (I c 1 ) :
The consumer chooses optimal period one consumption so as to maximize the Expected Utility EU (c 1 ; e c 2 ), where the NM index U does not take linear form (1).
The following demonstrates that the resulting optimal savings behavior need not change in response to a MPS (mean preserving spread) in the return e R.
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Example 2 Assume the consumer's NM index U is given by
where (c 1 ; c 2 ) 2 (0; 1) 2 . Although optimal consumption and savings behavior can be obtained by maximizing the Expected Utility corresponding to the NM index (4) subject to the constraint (3), one can more clearly see the impact of a MPS in e R on optimal savings behavior by considering a dual formulation. The …rst step is to eliminate the risk associated with the random return by using the certainty equivalent period two consumption b c 2 de…ned by
Substituting (3) and (4) into (5) yields
(6) Solving (6) for the certainty equivalent as a function of c 1 , the consumer can be viewed as solving the certainty problem
The solution to this problem is illustrated in Figure 2 (a), where I = 1 and the risky return e R pays o¤ 1:3 and 0:9 with equal probability. The concave curve corresponds to the certainty equivalent constraint b c 2 (c 1 ). It is straightforward to show that the consumption-savings optimum, corresponding to the tangency of this constraint and the certainty indi¤erence curve in the c 1 b c 2 plane, is given by c 1 = 0:5 which does not depend on the value of I and E e R 2 . Thus, optimal consumption and savings are independent of a MPS in e R. To demonstrate this, consider a MPS of the equiprobable risky investment's return where the payo¤s go from (1:3; 0:9) to (2:1; 0:1) resulting in the same mean E e R = 1:1 but a larger variance. This results in the new, lower certainty equivalent constraint in Figure 2(b) , where corresponding to each value of period one consumption except for c 1 = 0:5, b c 2 declines. Since the tangency point is unchanged, optimal consumption and savings are una¤ected by the MPS and the consumer exhibits risk neutrality despite the fact that her NM index does not take the linear form (1). 6 As is standard for any cumulative distribution functions F and G, G is a mean preserving spread of F if and only if e y = e x + e , where e x and e y are respectively the random variables corresponding to F and G, and E [e j e x] = 0. 7 This process has been used more generally in Selden [22] . 8 As is clear from the form of the NM index (4), the consumer will be risk neutral toward all c 2 -lotteries when her …rst period consumption satis…es c 1 = 0:5. 
Classic De…nitions of Risk Neutrality
In this section, we review the de…nitions of risk neutrality for both univariate and bivariate risks. Let c 1 2 C 1 and c 2 2 C 2 denote the quantities of two commodities, where unless stated otherwise C 1 = C 2 = (0; 1). De…ne C = C 1 C 2 . Let F i (i = 1; 2) denote the set of c.d.f.s (cumulative distribution functions) de…ned on C i and F i be an element in F i . J denotes the set of joint cumulative distribution functions de…ned on C 1 C 2 and J is an element in J . The c.d.f. J (c 1 ; c 2 ) corresponds to the random variable (e c 1 ; e c 2 ) which maps states of nature into speci…c consumption vectors (c 1 ; c 2 ). As is standard, to simplify subsequent discussions lotteries and c.d.f.s will be used interchangeably. It will be understood that when referring to a bivariate lottery L as being an element in J , we are referring to the uniquely determined c.d.f. J de…ned by the payo¤s and probabilities of the lottery L (see Machina [15] ). Similarly, the degenerate lotteries c i 2 F i (i = 1; 2) and c 2 J with certain payo¤s c i 2 C i and c = (c 1 ; c 2 ) 2 C, respectively, will be referred to as one point c.d.f.s. The set of degenerate lotteries c i is denoted as F i .
Throughout this section and the next, preferences over the choice space J are denoted by J and are assumed to be representable according to the Expected Utility principle where U : C 1 C 2 ! R is a twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and (weakly) concave NM index such that, for all J 1 ; J 2 2 J ,
First we de…ne risk neutrality in the single attribute case. Assume preferences are de…ned over the space of univariate distributions F 2 and are denoted by F 2 .
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Following Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [16] , p. 185, one can de…ne risk neutrality toward a given nondegenerate lottery as follows. If the single attribute preferences admit an Expected Utility representation, it is well-known that the NM index must be linear for an individual to be risk neutral toward all nondegenerate lotteries F 2 (c 2 ) 2 F 2 in the sense of De…nition 1.
10
In order to de…ne risk neutrality in the case where lotteries pay o¤ vectors c = (c 1 ; c 2 ) 2 C, we adopt the following natural extension of De…nition 1.
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De…nition 2 (Safra and Segal [21] ) An individual is risk neutral toward a given nondegenerate lottery J (c 1 ; c 2 ) 2 J if and only if the degenerate lottery (c 1 ;c 2 ) that pays o¤ (c 1 ; c 2 ) with certainty satis…es (c 1 ;c 2 ) s J J, where
and
9 We have chosen to use the notation c 2 and F 2 for the univariate case, since it can be directly applied to the special bivariate case considered in Section 5 where the …rst commodity is certain and the second is risky. 10 It should be noted that if we do not require an individual to be risk neutral toward all lotteries, then risk neutral behavior can occur if the NM index is linear over an interval of its domain. Since risk neutral behavior for this case is very similar to the case where the NM index is linear over its entire domain, we will simply include it as a special case of the linear form. A similar assumption will be made for the analogous multivariate case. 11 In the following de…nition and elsewhere when a lottery J (c 1 ; c 2 ) 2 J is referred to as being nondegenerate, this will be understood to exclude lotteries of the form (c1;c2) but not lotteries associated with the pairs ( c1 ; F 2 (c 2 )) or (F 1 (c 1 ) ; c2 ). 
This de…nition is based on the correlation between the random variables e c 1 and e c 2 , which is totally di¤erent from the notion of risk neutrality discussed in this paper.
If the De…nition 2 characterization of risk neutrality holds for all nondegenerate lotteries J (c 1 ; c 2 ) 2 J , then we obtain the following natural analogue of the restriction on the NM index for the univariate case (the proof is provided in the online Appendix F). The notion of a risk neutrality region follows naturally from De…nition 2.
De…nition 3 A risk neutrality region is a set of nondegenerate distributions
and (c 1 ;c 2 ) is de…ned as in De…nition 2.
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As illustrated by Example 1, an Expected Utility maximizer can exhibit risk neutral behavior toward a subset of distributions even if her NM index does not take the linear form (1) . As a result, Corollary 1 is too strong in that it gives conditions when an individual is or is not risk neutral toward all J 2 J . In the next section we consider when, as in Example 1, an individual with an NM index U can exhibit risk neutral behavior toward a subset of distributions in J .
Risk Neutrality Regions

Minimum Concavity Points, Minimum Concavity Directions and Least Concave Utility
To understand why the consumer in Example 1 (i) is risk neutral toward lottery L 1 even though the NM index does not take the linear form (1) and (ii) is not risk neutral toward L 3 , it will prove useful to review de Finetti's [5] notion of least concave utility (also see Debreu [3] ). Having assumed the existence of Expected Utility preferences where the NM index U is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and concave, we can introduce the following de…nition.
De…nition 4 Let U denote the set of all increasing monotone transforms of the twice continuously di¤erentiable, concave, strictly increasing real-valued function U . Then u 2 U is said to be least concave if and only if all other concave members of U are concave transforms of u, where u will always be assumed to be de…ned up to a positive a¢ ne transform.
Then we have the following existence result.
Proposition 1 (Debreu [3] ) Assume that preferences over J are representable by an Expected Utility function where the concave NM index U 2 U. Then there exists a least concave representation u de…ned on C such that
where f is concave. 13 Since risk neutrality toward degenerate lotteries is automatically satis…ed, in the rest of paper when discussing the risk neutrality region b J , we will exclude the degenerate lotteries. Given a concave NM index U , the process of …nding its least concave utility u can be broken into two steps. First, at each point c, identify the one or more directions of "maximum" convexity (or "minimum" concavity) as represented by the arrows in Figure 3 . Following Fenchel [6] , this search process corresponds to …nding the set of directions ( 1 ; 2 ) as functions of (c 1 ; c 2 ) (if they exist) that yield the following in…mum 14 a(c) = inf
where c = (c 1 ; c 2 ) and the partial derivatives
where the in…-mum is attained (if it exists) will be referred to as a minimum concavity direction (MCD). For the special cases, where the MCD corresponds to the slope of vertical or horizontal rays through (c 1 ; c 2 ), we follow the standard convention of referring to the directions as (0; 1) and (1; 0), respectively.
15
Having found the directions, the second step is to pick an indi¤erence curve U = t and then search along this curve for the speci…c point(s) c = (c 1 ; c 2 ) where 14 As additional clari…cation, de…ning
the process of selecting directions in eqn. (8) generates the functions 1 (c 1 ; c 2 ) and 2 (c 1 ; c 2 ). Substituting these functions back into q yields a(c): 15 Since in the two dimensional case, the MCD can be characterized equivalently by a vector or a slope, we use these two terms interchangeably.
concavity is minimized according to
Such a point will be referred to as a minimum concavity point (MCP). The least concave utility u can be derived from the following integration of G(t)
This formula de…nes u as a function of U (for each constant U ). If U itself is a function of c, then the repeated integral (10) yields a composite function u(c) = u(U (c)). Given that U is assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable, if we further assume that the Gaussian curvature of the indi¤erence curves is positive and the indi¤erence curves are compact on their compacti…ed domain, then a(c) and G(t) are continuous (see Kannai [9] for a detailed discussion). (See the discussion of compactifying the set C prior to De…nition 5 below.) It follows that u is also twice continuously di¤erentiable. One can interpret eqn. (10) as using the transform F to adjust the concavity of U at the point(s) determined by (9) in the ( 1 ; 2 ) direction obtained from (8) to the linear level, resulting in the least concave utility u. It should be noted that for a general U , although a(c) is minimized at the MCP in the corresponding MCD, it may not reach zero. However if one uses the least concave utility, then at each MCP, denoted c = (c 1 ; c 2 ), a(c ) becomes zero, i.e.,
Since ( 1 ; 2 ) cannot be a zero vector and the Hessian matrix is negative semide…nite, eqn. (11) implies that det H u = 0. For a strictly concave utility U , the Hessian matrix is negative de…nite and hence det H U can be zero only at limit (boundary) points. Therefore given a candidate concave utility u, if det H u = 0 at some interior points, then u is least concave (for further discussion, see Kannai and Selden [10] , footnote 8).
The MCD at the MCP (c 1 ; c 2 ) based on the least concave utility u is given in the following proposition. 17 Proposition 2 At the MCP (c 1 ; c 2 ), if the Hessian matrix based on u is not the zero matrix and satis…es
16 It should be noted that throughout this paper, all such double integrations give rise to constants which can be ignored given that the resulting representations are de…ned only up to positive a¢ ne transformations. 17 Unless indicated otherwise, proofs are provided in the Appendix to this article.
then the MCD is proportional (or parallel) to the vector
If the Hessian matrix based on u is the zero matrix, then every direction is a MCD.
We next discuss the connection between the set of MCPs and the MCDs. It will be convenient to compactify the commodity space. In fact given that a MCP may not be in the commodity space C, it is advantageous for certain forms of U to compactify C so as to include its boundary points (which may be in…nite). Then one can de…ne minimum concavity at a boundary point c by the asymptotic vanishing of the ratio of the Hessian and the Bordered Hessian determinants as points in C approach c. This compacti…ed domain is referred to as the extended domain C. The notion of extending the domain to include limit points is commonplace. See, for instance, Rockafellar ([19] , pp. [24] [25] . We may now state the following de…nitions.
De…nition 5 C is the set of all MCPs in the extended domain C associated with u.
Remark 2 Since C[ac 1 +bc 2 +d] represents a ray in C, its connected subset S[ac 1 + bc 2 + d] can be understood as a line segment (or ray). The reason to introduce the line segment is that for some utility functions, the set of MCPs may consist of a part or several parts of a ray but not the whole ray.
19 This is illustrated explicitly in the example considered in the online Appendix J.
Assume that S[ac 1 + bc 2 + d] C , implying that each point along the line segment is a MCP. Then as shown in Figure 4 (a), the slope of this MCP line segment is given by
18 For example, assuming the Cobb-Douglas utility, we have u = p c 1 c 2 . Since the set of MCPs is the whole space, it can be veri…ed that , i.e.,
then the slope of the MCP line segment and the MCD are the same. This is shown in Figure 4 (b). In Example 1, it can be veri…ed that the assumed NM index (2) is a¢ nely equivalent to the least concave utility u and the set of MCPs is the whole space (0; 5) 2 .
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It should be emphasized that Kannai and Selden ([10] , Proposition 4) have proved that if the utility function is (ordinally) additively separable (i.e., there exists a utility function U representing the preference such that U (c) = P n i=1 U i (c i )), then the set of MCPs is the whole space if and only if preferences are homothetic or quasihomothetic. Example 1 demonstrates that if U is not additively separable, which is the case for the utility (2), then the set of MCPs can still be the whole space even though preferences are neither homothetic nor quasihomothetic. For this U in Example 1 at any MCP (c 1 ; c 2 ), the MCD is given by ( 1 (c 1 ; c 2 ) ; 2 (c 1 ; c 2 )) = (1; 1). Therefore for any line segment parallel to the 45 degree ray, the MCD is the same as the slope of the ray. Thus an individual with the NM index (2) was seen to be risk neutral toward lottery L 1 which has its payo¤s on a line segment parallel to the 45 ray. For other lotteries such as L 3 with payo¤s lying on line segments not parallel to the 45 degree ray, the individual does not exhibit risk neutrality. Clearly for this utility there exist risk neutrality regions, and the least concave utility, the set of MCPs and the MCDs play important roles in determining risk neutral behavior.
Generalized Conditions for Risk Neutrality
We next (i) provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for when an individual will exhibit risk neutral behavior and (ii) characterize the subset of lotteries or equivalently distributions b J J toward which the individual is risk neutral.
Proposition 3 Assume that the NM index U = f u where f is a strictly increasing and concave transformation, u is the least concave utility as derived from eqn. (10) and U does not take the linear form (1) . The consumer will be risk neutral toward a given nondegenerate lottery J 2 J if and only if (i) f is a positive a¢ ne transformation;
(ii) 9a; b; d 2 R, such that the payo¤s of J are in the set S[
Remark 3 If the Hessian matrix becomes the zero matrix at all of the MCPs, then for every vector ( 1 ; 2 ), one always have
implying that every direction is a MCD and hence condition (iii) in Proposition 3 automatically holds.
Remark 4 In Proposition 3, an individual will be risk neutral toward a given nondegenerate lottery J only if the payo¤s of the lottery are collinear in the MCD. Thus, the only set of distributions that can satisfy Proposition 3 and comprise b J are those with perfectly correlated payo¤s.
It should be emphasized that Proposition 3 gives necessary and su¢ cient conditions for when an individual can simultaneously exhibit multivariate risk neutrality and possess an NM index not taking the linear form (1). Moreover, the risk neutral region b J of the choice space is comprised only of lotteries with collinear payo¤s lying on one or more rays C[ac 1 + bc 2 + d] or line segments S[ac 1 + bc 2 + d]. We want to emphasize that an NM utility taking the least concave form is not su¢ cient for the existence of risk neutrality regions. The restrictions on the set of MCPs and the MCDs play a crucial role. First although the set of MCPs can be a ray, its slope can diverge from the MCD. This is illustrated by least concave utility corresponding to the NM index U (c 1
2 . In each of these cases, the set b J is empty. (See the online Appendix H for additional discussion.)
Remark 5 In Kihlstrom and Mirman [13] and Kihlstrom [14] , the authors use Debreu's [3] decomposition U = f u to analyze multiperiod savings behavior and asset pricing. They consider the special case of homothetic preferences. Kihlstrom [14] , p. 638, argues that "in the Kihlstrom-Mirman approach, u is the risk neutral representation of preferences". However it should be emphasized that in the multivariate case, the least concave utility u for general preferences results in risk neutral behavior only for the special subset of lotteries characterized in Proposition 3.
We next illustrate the application of Proposition 3 assuming an individual's NM index takes the classic CES (constant elasticity of substitution) form. As is wellknown, the corresponding least concave utility is given by 
where C = (0; 1) 2 . Since CES preferences are homothetic, every point in C is a MCP. 21 To …nd the MCD, it is straightforward to show that
It follows that each MCP lies on a ray through the origin. Corresponding to the MCP (c 1 ; kc 1 ), both the MCD and the slope of the ray through this point are equal to k. Hence following Proposition 3, each ray through the origin corresponds to a risk neutral ray. See Figure 5 .
22
Given the ability of CES preferences to meet the requirements for the existence of risk neutrality regions, it is natural to wonder if homotheticity is perhaps a necessary 21 See Kannai and Selden [10] , Proposition 3. 22 It should be noted that although the risk neutral rays in Figure 5 look like expansion paths corresponding to di¤erent price ratios, any geometric similarity is purely coincidental. This is con…rmed by Example 1, where we continue to have risk neutral line segments but since preferences are not homothetic or quasihomothetic, the expansion paths are not linear. 
Summary: Special Cases
Eight classes of utility functions are considered in Table 1 . The …rst column gives the number of the utility class, the second column gives the form of the utility and the third column gives parametric restrictions that can result in di¤erent entries in other columns. Columns 4-6, respectively, provide the corresponding MCD, least concave utility and MCPs. Columns 7 and 8 will be discussed in the next section. All eight classes are ordinally additively separable. The special cases of CES utilities, classes 2-4, are homothetic. Class 1 and the negative exponential class 5 are quasihomothetic. 24 Classes 6-8 are neither homothetic nor quasihomothetic.
The class 8 utility function was introduced by Wold and Jureen [25] to illustrate Gi¤en good behavior. 23 Although the CES and Example 1 utilities, (12) and (2) 
0;
where the equal sign holds if and only if c 1 = c 2 . Thus, the set of minimum concavity points corresponds to the single line segment c 2 = c 1 (0 < c 1 < 1). Since this utility function becomes linear along this line segment, it results in risk neutral behavior. 24 Pollak [17] observes that the negative exponential utility is homothetic to the translated origin 
The Certain Risky Special Case
So far, we have focused on the case where both choice variables are risky. However in a number of important applications, such as the classic consumption-savings, consumption-portfolio and multiperiod asset pricing problems, it is common to assume that consumption in the …rst period is certain and risky in subsequent periods. For this certain risky case, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for risk neutrality require modi…cation.
Moreover except in special cases, the least concave utility derived in the prior section does not extend to the certain risky setting. This fact does not seem to have been recognized in the literature (see, for example, the analysis in Kihlstrom and Mirman [13] and Kihlstrom [14] ). Failure to make this distinction can result in an improper characterization of risk neutrality regions in the certain risky choice space.
De…nition of Risk Neutrality
In seeking to extend the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for risk neutrality summarized in Proposition 3 to the certain risky setting, one essential di¤erence is that the certainty of c 1 forces the MCD to be ( 1 ; 2 ) = (0; 1) in C 1 C 2 and requires that the least concave utility be linear in this direction. This results in a generally di¤erent least concave utility from the bivariate risk case. Consistent with this restriction on the MCD, in this section we will denote the certain risky choice space as C 1 F 2 and assume that the preferences C 1 F 2 are representable by an Expected Utility function R
, where the NM index U is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and (weakly) concave in c 2 . This concavity assumption di¤ers from of the bivariate risky case in Sections 3 and 4 where U was assumed to be (weakly) concave in both c 1 and c 2 . (The signi…cance of this di¤erence is illustrated by the case of Cobb-Douglas utility discussed in Subsection 6.1 below.) It will prove convenient to introduce the following de…nition of risk neutrality for the certain risky case. 25 De…nition 7 For a given pair (c 1 ; F 2 (c 2 )) 2 C 1 F 2 , an individual is said to be risk neutral toward the nondegenerate lottery F 2 (c 2 ) if and only if (c 1 ; F 2 (c 2 )) 25 Given our assumption that preferences in the bivariate risky setting, J , are representable by an Expected Utility function, it follows that preferences in the certain risky setting will also be representable by an Expected Utility function if the latter preferences agree with the former when restricted to C 1 F 2 . In this case, clearly De…nition 7 is a special case of De…nition 2. However as noted by Rossman and Selden [20] , p. 75, there may be good reasons for not making this embedding argument, such as the consumer simply not possessing preferences outside the economically meaningful world of C 1 F 2 .
(c 1 ; c 2 ), where c 2 denotes the degenerate distribution paying o¤ c 2 = R c 2 dF 2 (c 2 ) with certainty.
It is clear that for all pairs (c 1 ; F 2 (c 2 )) 2 C 1 F 2 , an investor will be risk neutral toward each of the corresponding nondegenerate lotteries F 2 (c 2 ) in the sense of De…nition 7 if and only if her NM index U (c 1 ; c 2 ) takes the following form which is linear in c 2 but not necessarily linear in c 1
where h (c 1 ) > 0 and g (c 1 ) are strictly increasing functions. The fact that the NM index U in (13) can be nonlinear in c 1 , implies that it di¤ers from the restriction (1) associated with risk neutrality in the bivariate risky case. However if U takes the form (1), then it also satis…es (13) as can be seen by de…ning = h(c 1 ) and c 1 + = g(c 1 ).
Minimum Concavity Points, Minimum Concavity Direction and Least Concave Utility
A key element in the derivation of the least concave utility u is the determination of the minimum concavity direction ( 1 ; 2 ). However given the change in the choice space from J to C 1 F 2 , the MCD can no longer be any direction as in Figure  6 (a). Rather, the MCD can only be the direction ( 1 ; 2 ) = (0; 1) as indicated in Figure 6 (b) since movement between points not on vertical rays is precluded by the …rst variable being certain. The least concave utility u, derived from eqn. (10), despite satisfying det H u = 0 at minimum concavity points, will in general fail to (i) be "linear"in the required direction ( 1 ; 2 ) = (0; 1) and (ii) satisfy u 22 = 0. Hence one cannot use u as the basis for de…ning risk neutrality regions in C 1 F 2 . We next derive the least concave utility which is appropriate for the choice space C 1 F 2 . Substitution of the required direction ( 1 ; 2 ) = (0; 1) into eqn. (8) and following the same process as was used to derive u yields
where the "bars" over a, G, F and u indicate that the functions correspond to the certain risky choice space. Given that U is assumed to be twice continuously (See the online Appendix I for a more complete analysis of u.) We next characterize the relationship between u and u.
Proposition 4
The utility functions u and u are equivalent up to a positive a¢ ne transformation if and only if u is concave.
It should be noted that if the NM index U is not concave, then u may not exist. But u can still exist.
27 This is illustrated in the following example. 26 There can be one or many c 1 -values associated with MCPs in the (0; 1) direction. Consider the Cobb-Douglas case referenced as class 4 in Table 1 . For the least concave utility u(c 1 ; c 2 ) every point in C 1 C 2 is a MCP and the utility is linear in the (0; 1) direction for any vertical ray.
For the other members of the CES class of utility functions (classes 1-3 in Table 1 ), u 22 = 0 only at a single c 1 -value. 27 When each choice variable is risky, Debreu's [3] su¢ cient condition for the existence of u is the concavity of U . Analogously in the certain risky case, U 22 0 is su¢ cient for the existence of u.
Example 3 Assume the NM index takes the form
where c 1 2 (0; 2) and c 2 2 C 2 . Clearly U is not concave. A simple computation shows that the right hand side of eqn. (8) and u fails to exist. (A non-computational argument on this point due to Aumann [1] is reproduced in Kannai [9] .) On the other hand, there exists a u which is equivalent up to a positive a¢ ne transform to U since
When u and u fail to be a¢ nely equivalent, one obtains the following decomposition of a given NM index U , which di¤ers from the decomposition in eqn. (7),
where f is the modi…ed Debreu representation of an individual's risk preferences.
To connect the set of MCPs to risk neutrality in the certain risky setting, we next introduce the following de…nitions analogous to De…nitions 5 and 6. De…nition 9 C is the set of all the minimum concavity points in the extended domain C associated with u.
Re ‡ecting the requirement that the MCD must correspond to ( 1 ; 2 ) = (0; 1), the de…nitions of a ray and line segments in De…nition 6 are next modi…ed to ensure that c 1 = d.
We next give necessary and su¢ cient conditions for risk neutrality regions in C 1 F 2 , where the NM index U can take forms other than just the linear utility (13) which ensures risk neutrality toward all lotteries F 2 (c 2 ) 2 F 2 in the choice space.
Proposition 5 Assume that U = f u where f is a strictly increasing and concave transformation, u is the least concave form as derived from eqn. (14) . For a given pair (c 1 ; F 2 (c 2 )) 2 C 1 F 2 , the consumer will be risk neutral toward the nondegenerate lottery F 2 (c 2 ) if and only if In the certain risky setting, if the conditions in Proposition 5 are satis…ed, then an individual will be risk neutral toward any lottery with the payo¤s along the vertical line segment (or ray) S [c 1 d].
28 Table 1 ( 1 (c 1 ; c 2 ) ; 2 (c 1 ; c 2 )) are given in column 4, whereas for u it is understood that ( 1 (c 1 ; c 2 ) ; 2 (c 1 ; c 2 )) = (0; 1) holds for each of the 8 classes. Column 7 gives u and column 8 provides the special c 1 values, denoted x , which characterizes the vertical ray containing the MCPs where u 22 = 0. From inspecting the table, it will be noted that in a number of cases, u and u are not a¢ nely equivalent. For instance the class 1 utility, corresponding to the HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) family, provides an interesting example of how the least concave utilities can diverge.
It can be seen from the last column in Table 1 that for each of the eight classes of utility, x either lies at a boundary of C 1 or corresponds to any point in C 1 . However in general, this is not the case as can be seen by considering the NM index (4) used in Examples 2 and 4. It can be veri…ed that this U is concave. and not along a vertical ray. 29 There also exist NM indices such that the set of MCPs corresponds to a set of discrete vertical line segments. Suppose the NM index is a¢ nely equivalent to
where 1 ; 1 ; 2 ; 2 ; 2 are appropriately chosen to ensure that u is strictly increasing. Then u 22 = 0 for each i 2 (1; :::; n). However, in general, u will be neither concave nor a¢ nely equivalent to u.
consumer exhibits an indi¤erence to a mean preserving spread in risk and why at an aggregate economy endowment of c 1 the equilibrium risk premium equals 0.
It should be noted that for each of the utilities considered in Table 1 , u is linear in c 2 along one or all vertical rays where every point on each ray is a MCP. In each case, an individual will be risk neutral toward all lotteries with payo¤s on these vertical rays. However, this is not true in general as illustrated by the discussion in footnote 28 and online Appendix J. Corresponding to two di¤erent c 1 -values, one portion of the MCPs lies along a line segment and a second portion lies along a ray. In terms of condition (ii)
corresponding to the two portions of C . As a result the choice space is comprised of two discrete risk neutrality regions.
Applications
In this section, we investigate the implications of our risk neutrality analysis for the classic consumption-savings problem and a representative agent equilibrium asset pricing model, which assumes the two period certain risky setting. In the online Appendix K, a single period consumption-bequest optimization model is considered where both variables are risky. We show that Proposition 3 can be directly employed in this setting to characterize when the equilibrium expected return on a risky asset equals the risk free rate.
Income Risk: Confounding u and u
As referenced in Remark 5, the Debreu decomposition U = f u has been employed in consumption-savings applications. Unfortunately this decomposition has been used in cases where the …rst period is a certain and the choice space corresponds to C 1 F 2 . To illustrate the type of incorrect conclusions that can be reached by not using the appropriate u introduced in the prior section, assume the consumer's preferences are represented by the familiar Cobb-Douglas form referred to as class 4 in Table 1 U (c 1 ; c 2 ) = c 30 Kihlstrom [14] , p. 637, discusses the application of Cobb-Douglas utility in a two period consumption-savings problem, where the …rst period is certain. However, he incorrectly uses u instead of u to characterize risk neutral behavior.
Assume two time periods, where certain …rst period and random second period consumption are denoted, respectively, by c 1 and e c 2 . The consumer is endowed with certain period one income I 1 and random period two income e I 2 . Let s 1 denote period one savings. The consumer maximizes EU (c 1 ; e c 2 ) subject to c 1 = I 1 s 1 and e c 2 = e I 2 + s 1 :
The optimization problem can be expressed as
We next consider the e¤ect of a mean preserving spread (see footnote 6) of e I 2 on optimal s 1 where the NM index takes the Cobb-Douglas form. then the optimal saving s 1 is unchanged with a MPS of e I 2 .
From Result 1, it can be seen that s 1 is unchanged with a mean preserving spread of e I 2 , or the consumer is risk neutral, if the NM index is a¢ nely equivalent to u. However when period one consumption is certain, erroneously using u as the least concave utility leads to the incorrect conclusion that the consumer changes her savings behavior in response to increased period two income risk. The reason for this can be seen from observing that
Thus, incorrectly using u results in the consumer being risk averse since u is more concave than u. It should be also noted that the widely used log additive two period NM index U can as well be viewed as a concave transformation of u, i.e., ln u. Therefore, the consumer with the log NM index is also risk averse. This is consistent with the well known result that if utility takes the additively separable form U (c 1 ; c 2 ) = U 1 (c 1 ) + U 2 (c 2 ) and the third derivative of the component utility U 2 (c 2 ) is positive, then savings strictly increase with a MPS of second period income.
Two Period Consumption-Portfolio Equilibrium
Consider a two period representative agent exchange equilibrium based on a consumptionportfolio optimization. In period one, the agent chooses c 1 as well as asset holdings in a risky asset and risk free asset. Let n and n f denote the number of units of the risky asset and risk free asset, respectively. The period two payo¤s on the risky and risk free assets are given respectively by e and f > 0. Random period two consumption is given by e c 2 = e n + f n f :
The agent maximizes EU (c 1 ; e c 2 ) subject to the budget constraint
where p and p f are the prices of the risky and risk free assets and c 1 , n and n f are respectively the endowments of period one consumption, the risky asset and the risk free asset. The following demonstrates that the equilibrium risk premium can be zero for a speci…c endowment of period one consumption and is positive for other values of c 1 even though the NM index does not take the linear form (13) . and
As is standard, de…ne the equilibrium risk premium by
Substituting from (17) and (18), yields where i is the payo¤ of e with the probability i (i = 1; 2), we plot in Figure 7 the risk premium E e R R f for di¤erent values of the endowment c 1 . It will be noted that the risk premium is strictly positive for all values of c 1 6 = 0:5, implying the representative agent and the economy are risk averse. The fact that the risk premium equals 0 at c 1 = 0:5, can be con…rmed easily by substituting c 1 = 0:5 into eqn. (19) , which yields E e R R f = 5:5E e 5E e 5:5 5 = 0:
Thus for this particular endowment, the economy is risk neutral even though the representative agent's NM index (4) does not take the linear form (13) . This is because the representative agent's utility (4) assumed here is a least concave utility u as discussed in Subsection 5. 31 It will be observed that when c 1 = 0:5, no matter what values n and n f take, we always have E e R R f = 0. The reason is that when c 1 = 0:5, the utility function (4) becomes U = 2:75 + 5c 2 , which is linear. Therefore, the indi¤erence curves corresponding to EU = 2:75 + 5 E e n + f n f are parallel lines in n n f space with slope equal to E e = f . Therefore the representative agent's indi¤erence curves will coincide with the budget line with the same slope, implying that
Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the univariate characterization of risk neutrality to the multivariate case for Expected Utility preferences where for the latter the NM index is assumed not to be linear in each of its arguments. Building on Debreu's [3] decomposition of the NM index into a risk preference function and a least concave utility and utilizing the notions of minimum concavity points and minimum concavity directions, we characterize risk neutral behavior for the case where each of the choice variables is risky and for the case where one variable is certain. As applications we show that, even though the bivariate NM index of an Expected Utility maximizer is not linear in both arguments, (i) an individual consumer's optimal savings behavior can be una¤ected by a mean preserving spread in income risk and (ii) a representative agent two period equilibrium risk premium can be zero for certain speci…c consumption endowments.
In this paper we focus only on the Expected Utility case. However since considerable laboratory evidence suggests that the observed behavior of individuals can be inconsistent with the Expected Utility axioms, an area of potentially interesting future research would seem to be to consider the extension of our analysis to non-Expected Utility models such as Cumulative Prospect Theory, Rank Dependent Utility and Ambiguity preferences (see, for example, Wakker [24] for an excellent summary of these models). for the least concave form u, we have
If at c = (c 1 ; c 2 ) the Hessian matrix based on u is the zero matrix, then for any , the following must always hold
if p=p f = E e = f , there are in…nite number of optimal asset allocations. If p=p f 6 = E e = f , there is no interior optimum. Thus in equilibrium when c 1 = 0:5, p=p f = E e = f holds for any (n; n f ) values implying that E e R R f = 0. 32 As noted below prior to Remark 6, this discussion is valid even if 1 = 0.
implying that a(c ) reaches an in…mum and hence every direction is a MCD. Otherwise, taking the derivative of
with respect to and setting it to be zero yields
implying that
When u 1 u 22 u 2 u 12 j (c 1 ;c 2 ) 6 = 0, the MCD is proportional (or parallel) to the vector
When u 1 u 22 u 2 u 12 j (c 1 ;c 2 ) = 0 (corresponding to 1 = 0) and u 2 u 11 u 1 u 12 j (c 1 ;c 2 ) 6 = 0, it is clear that the MCD continues to be proportional (or parallel) to the vector (u 1 u 22 u 2 u 12 ; u 2 u 11 u 1 u 12 )j (c 1 ;c 2 ) :
Remark 6 If one uses the coordinate system where c 1 corresponds to the direction tangent to the indi¤erence curve and c 2 corresponds to the direction normal to the indi¤erence curve (the price direction), then the MCD can be obtained from
where u 11 measures the strict concavity of u. (See Kannai [9] , p. 301.)
B Proof of Proposition 3
To prove this proposition, we …rst state and prove the following lemma which can be used to directly verify whether u becomes linear on S[ac 1 + bc 2 + d] without deriving the MCPs and MCDs.
Lemma 1 Assume that the NM index U = f u where f is a strictly increasing and concave transformation, u is the least concave utility derived from eqn. 
:
On the line segment ac 1 + bc 2 + d = 0, where H U is the Hessian Matrix. Since U is concave, H U is negative semide…nite, implying that < 0 always holds and hence the consumer's NM index cannot be linear in c 1 , which contradicts the conclusion above. Therefore, we require that f is an a¢ ne transformation and u becomes linear along ac 1 + bc 2 + d = 0. This completes the proof.
Next we prove 
C Proof of Proposition 4
First prove necessity. If u(c) = au(c) + b for some a > 0, then clearly u is concave. Next prove su¢ ciency. If u is concave, then u 2 U, and there exists a strictly monotone real-valued concave function g de…ned on the range of u such that u = g(u). If g 00 (t) < 0 with t = u(c 1 ; c 2 ), then straightforward computation shows that
g 00 (t) g 0 (t) 2 , so that
cannot vanish (or tend to zero) along the indi¤erence curve u(c 1 ; c 2 ) = t. Therefore u and u are equivalent up to a positive a¢ ne transformation.
Next we show that using u, s 1 is una¤ected by a MPS of e I 2 . When U = f u, ignoring the positive a¢ ne transformation, the optimization problem is 1 E e I 2 + s 1 :
Taking the natural logarithm on both sides of equation (22) 
